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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case no. 950338-CA

vs.
TIMOTHY KENT REDMOND,
Defendant and Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Order of Commitment
signed and entered on April 26, 1995, by the Honorable John R.
Anderson, in and for the Eighth District Court, Uintah County,
State of Utah.

The Judgment and Order of Commitment was entered

after a jury trial in which the jury had found defendant/appellant
guilty of possession of stolen property,
76-6-408, a second degree felony.

Utah Code Ann. section

This Court has appellate

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.
1992), and Rule 26(2) (a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Was there insufficient evidence for the jury to find
1

defendant guilty?

The standard of review is was the evidence

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.

See, State v.

Wright. 893 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995) .
2.

Did the court calendar, which was posted near the jury

check-in area, and which indicated that appellant was to have a
disposition hearing on other criminal charges, prejudice the jury
panel in this case to such an extent that the defendant was not
afforded his right to a fair and impartial jury?

The standard of

review is would the notice on the calendar probably have had an
influence on the verdict.

See, Gee v. Smith, 541 P.2d 6 (Utah

1975) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads,
in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ....
Article

1 Section

12 of

the Utah

relevant, and reads substantially the same.
section 77-1-6(f)

Constitution

is also

Also, Utah Code Ann.

(1953 as amended), is applicable, and reads

substantially the same.
Section 76-6-408 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), reads:
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of
2

the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or
believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals,
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property
to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with possession of stolen property, a
cond degree felony. (R. 1). A jury trial was held on March 10,
95. The jury found appellant guilty as charged. Pursuant to the
ilty verdict, Judge Anderson signed and entered a Judgment and
ier of Commitment on April 26, 1995.
figment

and

Order

of

(R. 130) . Pursuant to this

Commitment,

appellant

is

presently

^arcerated at the Utah State Prison.
RELEVANT FACTS
1. Before the trial began, the court clerk posted a calendar
the bulletin board near the area where the members of the jury
lei were to report.
2.

(R. 204).

At the top of the calendar was the notice for the jury

Lai for which the panel members were reporting, and immediately
Low this notice was a notice of a "disposition hearing" for
pellant in another case where he was charged with theft of
rvices.

(R. 58).

3

3.

Trial counsel for appellant1 saw the calendar, took it

down, and brought it to the attention of Judge Anderson and the
Uintah County attorney, Joann Stringham.
4.

(R. 204).

In dealing with this potentially prejudicial material,

Judge Anderson asked both counsel, "how can we deal with that?" (R.
205) .
5.

Counsel for the State responded, "let's end it right now

and call a new jury a week from now.
watch the bulletin board."

I watch the jury, and they

(R. 205) .

6. The court clerk suggested that panelists that had checked
in prior to the calendar being taken down could be automatically
excused.
7.

(R. 206) .
It was suggested by counsel for the State that Judge

Anderson could ask the remainder of the panel if any of them had
seen the calendar. Judge Anderson indicated he was not comfortable
with that suggestion as it might alert the remainder of the panel
that appellant may have other cases.

(R. 207).

8. Although it was impossible to determine for sure how many
panelists actually saw the calendar, Judge Anderson decided to
simply excuse the five that had definitely checked in prior to the
approximate time the calendar was taken down, and then not ask the
x

Trial counsel for appellant was Alan Williams.
He
subsequently withdrew as counsel for appellant after the jury
trial.
4

remaining panelists if any had seen the calendar. The decision was
not objected to by either counsel.
9.

(R. 218).

During the trial, appellant testified on his own behalf,

and admitted on direct examination that he had been convicted
previously of forgery a few years prior to the present charge.
404) .
10.

(R.

|
At or near the beginning of the empaneling of the jury,

Judge Anderson read the Information to the panelists.

The State

alleged through the Information that the property that appellant
supposedly had possession of was an "operable motor vehicle."

(R.

1 and 239, 240) .
11. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Anderson instructed
the jury that one of the elements they had to find beyond a
reasonable doubt before appellant could be convicted was that the
property in question was an "operable" motor vehicle.
12.

(R. 77) .

During the course of the trial the State presented

several witnesses. One of which was Lee Berge, a used car salesman
from Orem.

He testified that on or about September 23, 1994, he

noticed missing from his inventory a red 1985 Mazda with a VIN of
JM1BD2316F0819150.

(R. 297,298, and 302) . He reported the vehicle

to the Orem police as stolen.

Mr. Berge also indicated that the

vehicle was from Arizona, and had an Arizona title.
13.

(R. 3 02).

On or about September 23, 1994, other state witnesses
5

testified that they saw appellant in possession of a red Mazda, but
they indicated that this vehicle had Washington plates.

(R. 349) .

14. Another witness, Andrea Hardman, indicated that sometime
in September of 1994, she became acquainted with appellant because
he was dating her sister.

She indicated that she saw appellant in

possession of a blue Mazda and a red Mazda, and that at various
times she was interested in purchasing both of the vehicles.

(R.

348 - 350) .
15. Andrea testified that on one occasion it appeared to her
that appellant was changing parts between the two vehicles.
350).

(R.

Andrea further testified that on the evening of October 7,

1994, she and her husband went to appellant's residence to inquire
about purchasing the red Mazda.

It was at this time that Andrea

indicated that the vehicle was "all tore up."
wouldn't run anymore."
16.

and that "it

(R. 354).

Andrea testified that appellant said that since the

vehicle was all tore up and wouldn't run anymore that he would give
it to her for parts, and that she didn't need to license it since
was just a parts car.

(R. 354 - 356) .

17. Andrea testified that she saw appellant between 5:00 and
7:00 pm. on the evening of October 7th (R. 368), and that, because
the vehicle was inoperable, they pushed it to her residence
sometime between 6:30 and 7:00 pm. (R. 3 69) , and that the last time
6

she saw appellant that evening was sometime between 8:30 and 9:30
pm. (R. 369).
18.

Andrea testified that after they had pushed the vehicle

to their house they began to suspect that the vehicle may have been
stolen due to appellant's alleged comments. The next day they
called the police to investigate.
19.

(R. 331). |

The officer who investigated discovered that the VIN on

the vehicle at the Hardman residence matched the VIN of the red
Mazda reported stolen from Mr. Berge.
20.
Mazda.
21.

(R. 330).

This officer did not take any fingerprints from the red
(R. 138).
Diane Davis, another witness for the State, testified

that she saw appellant and Ms. Hardman pushing the vehicle on
October 7th between 8:00 and 8:30 pm.

(R. 386).

22. Doug Hardman, Andrea Hardman7s husband, testified that he
saw appellant and Andrea pushing the red Mazda between 4:00 and
4:30 pm. on October 7th.
23.

(R. 459).

Floyd Collette, an LDS bishop, testified on appellant's

behalf, and indicated that he met with appellant and Kris Redmond2
on the evening of October 7th, at about 7:00 pm. and that he met
with them for about 15 minutes, and that appellant was neatly

2

Appellant and Kris Redmond were dating at the time, and
subsequently married.
7

dressed.
24.

(R. 395, 396) .
Rachel Bezzant testified on appellant's behalf, and

indicated that sometime in November of 1994, she purchased from
appellant a red 1982 Mazda for $100.00, and that although appellant
didn't have a title to the vehicle, she was able to acquire one
later through the State of Utah without any complications.
400) .

(R.

She further testified that the VIN on the vehicle she

purchased from appellant was JM1BD2310C0605816, which is different
than the VIN of the vehicle which the officer investigated.

(R.

401) .
25. Appellant testified on his own behalf, and indicated that
he did have possession of a red Mazda during the times in question,
but that it was a 1982 Mazda that he had purchased from a man by
the name of Antonio Vigil in Springville, Utah, on September 24,
1994.

(R. 407).
26. Appellant testified that on October 7th that he and Kris

left Salt Lake City about 4:00 pm. to go to Vernal to talk to
Bishop Collette about financial assistance. It took them about two
hours and 45 minutes to make the trip. He met with Bishop Collette
about 7:00 pm. and then he drove his blue Mazda back to Salt Lake
City, and Kris drove the red Mazda back to Salt Lake City.

At no

time did he meet with Andrea Hardman that evening, at no time did
he offer to give the car to her for parts, and at no time did he
8

tell her not to license it, and at no time did he push the car to
her residence.
27.

(R. 413 - 415).

Kris Redmond testified and corroborated what appellant

had testified to concerning the events of the evening of October
7th.

(R. 441) .
28.

There

was

no

evidence

presented

that

appellant

participated in a theft of the vehicle in Orem, and there was no
evidence admitted that appellant supposedly made any confessions
that he knew the car was stolen.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant was denied a trial by an "impartial" jury because of
the court calendar which indicated to all who looked at it,
including potential

jury panelists, that appellant

pending criminal charges.

had other

Although Judge Anderson attempted to

alleviate this problem by excusing some of the panelists, to make
sure there was not any chance of partiality, he should have
followed the prosecutor's initial suggestion to come back in a week
and start all over again with a new panel.

Even though appellant

freely admitted that he had a previous forgery conviction, there is
no question that if a jury member knew that appellant currently had
other pending charges, the cumulative affect would certainly have
an influence on the verdict, especially when the credibility of the
appellant was a key issue.
9

There was insufficient evidence to convict appellant because
the testimony given by the State's witnesses was inconclusive in
that the car reportedly stolen was from Arizona and the State's
witnesses said the car they saw appellant in possession of had
Washington plates; and in that three different State's witnesses
said appellant was pushing the car at three different times on
October 7th; and in that the state's witnesses said the vehicle was
inoperable; and in that the investigating officer failed to take
fingerprints

from

the vehicle

which

could

have

conclusively

indicated who had possession of the vehicle; and in that there was
no direct evidence that appellant knew the car was stolen.
Furthermore, the testimony of the State's witnesses as to the
events of October 7th was inherently improbable in that how could
appellant be in work clothes and pushing a car to another residence
at about the same time Bishop Collette said that he was meeting
with appellant, and appellant was neatly dressed.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL
JURY.
The

Sixth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution

guarantees that " in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.
10

. . .,f3 In the case of Gee v. Smith. 541 P.2d 6 (Utah 1975), the
defendant in that case also claimed that he was denied his right to
an impartial jury because of some photographs that were shown to a
member of the jury outside of the courtroom.

Id. at 6, 7.

The

Utah Supreme Court held in Gee that, since there were other
photographs of the victim shown to the jury in the courtroom, the
photograph seen out of the courtroom probably had no prejudicial
effect. Id. at 7. However, in reaching this conclusion, the Utah
Supreme focused on whether it appeared that the extrajudicial
material "had an influence on producing the verdict rendered." Id.
at 7. Consequently, what must be determined in this case is first,
whether members of the jury were exposed to material or evidence
outside of the trial proceedings, and second, if that material
could have had an influence on the verdict rendered.
It was acknowledged by Judge Anderson and the prosecutor that
the jury pool was exposed to potentially prejudicial material by
the clerk of the court posting the court calendar in an area where
the jury panelists were congregating, with the calendar indicating
immediately below the trial notice that appellant was also to
appear for a disposition hearing on another charge of theft of
services.

In attempting to resolve this problem, Judge Anderson

3

Article 1 section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and section
77-1-6(1) (f) , also articulate this right under Utah state law with
essentially the same language as the Sixth Amendment.
11

decided to simply excuse those jurors that they knew had checked in
prior to the approximate time that the calendar was taken down.
But admittedly, it was impossible to determine with 100% certainty
which panelists had seen the calendar, and which ones hadn't. There
may have been other panelists who saw the calendar just before it
was taken down and before they actually checked in with the clerk.
To be absolutely certain, Judge Anderson could have asked the
remaining panelists if any had looked at the court calendar that
day. Judge Anderson was correct in indicating that there certainly
would be some risk in doing that, in that it may alert some
panelists that the defendant may have some other cases before the
court, but it is submitted that the risk actually would have been
minimal.

All Judge Anderson would have had to do was ask "who has

seen the court calendar this morning?!|, and then, if any raised
their hands, he could have interviewed each one in chambers to
ascertain what they had seen.
Where important constitutional rights are concerned, such as
the right to an impartial jury, the benefit of the doubt should be
given to the defendant, and if the judge felt too uncomfortable in
asking the remaining panelists if any had seen the calendar, then
he should have followed the prosecutor's recommendation to come
back the following week with a completely new panel.

That way

there would be no question that the jury was not prejudiced in any
12

manner by the court calendar.

As it is, there is a significant

lingering question.
The second question is, assuming a jury member may have seen
the calendar indicating appellant had other criminal charges, could
that knowledge have influenced the verdict in this case, even
though appellant freely admitted in his own testimony that he had
a prior conviction for forgery?

The answer is yes!

The reason for this conclusion is that in a trial of this
nature,

where

the

jurors

are

attempting

to

decide

between

conflicting stories, the perceived credibility of the witnesses is
of ultimate significance, and where a juror may know that a witness
has other criminal convictions, that knowledge could certainly tip
the scales in favor of not believing him. True, the jurors in this
case had in-court knowledge that appellant had a prior felony
conviction.

However, it is the cumulative effect of knowing that

there is yet a third criminal charge against

the defendant.

knowing of one prior conviction would certainly alert the juror to
maybe examine the witness' testimony with scrutiny, but knowing
that there are additional convictions would almost certainly nail
the coffin shut, so to speak, on any possibility of the jury
accepting the witness' veracity.

It would be too easy at that

point to simply believe that the witness is repeatedly being
charged with criminal behavior, and should not be believed at all,
13

and that is apparently what happened in the instant case.

Even

though the State's witnesses were inconsistent on significant
points, and even though the appellant had three alibi witnesses,
the jury totally disregarded that evidence and found the appellant
guilty.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "...jurors
have a correlative duty to consider only evidence that is presented
in open court; and when it appears that the jury has obtained or
used extraneous material, the defendant is entitled to a new trial
if there is a reasonable possibility that such material could have
affected the verdict." See, Hughes v. Bora, 898 F.2d 695 (9th Cir.
1990) .

Such should be the result here.

At a minimum, appellant

should be entitled to a new trial so as to remove even the
possibility that the jury could be tainted by the knowledge that
the appellant had several criminal convictions.

POINT II
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE APPELLANT
This Court has held that "we will upset the jury verdict only
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted."

See, State v. Wright, 893 P. 2d 1113, 1117 (Utah
14

App. 1995).

The State's evidence was sufficiently inconclusive

and/or inherently improbable in the following particulars.
First, one of the elements that Judge Anderson instructed the
jury that they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt was that the
vehicle in question was an "operable" motor vehicle. The evidence
on this point was for the most part contrary to showing that the
vehicle was operable.

The State's key witness, Andrea Hardman,

testified that the car appeared "all tore up" and "it wouldn't run
anymore."
residence.

That is why they presumably had to push it to her
It was inconclusive as to whether the State had shown

that the vehicle was operable.
Next, the used car dealer from Orem testified that the car
that was supposedly taken from his lot was from Arizona with an
Arizona title.

However, the State's own witnesses testified that

the red Mazda they saw appellant in had Washington plates on it.
The issue of whether appellant actually ever had possession of the
car that was reported stolen is inconclusive.
Next, if it is believed that appellant did actually have
possession of the vehicle that was reported stolen, there is no
direct evidence that appellant knew that it was stolen or believed
that it was stolen as required by section 76-6-408, Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended).

There was no evidence presented by the State

indicating that appellant was actually involved in the theft of the
15

vehicle. In addition, none of the State's witnesses ever said that
appellant admitted that he knew it was stolen. Consequently, what
the jury was left to do is infer that appellant must have known
that the car was stolen based on circumstantial evidence such as
the disputed allegations that he did not have a title to the
vehicle, that he was going to give it to Andrea Hardman for parts,
and that he told Andrea that she didn't need to license it because
it was just a parts car.

These allegations are inconclusive in

showing that appellant must have known the car was stolen.

If

indeed, it was being given away as parts, then appellant would be
completely justified in telling Andrea that she didn't need to
license it.
Next, three of the State's key witnesses were drastically
inconsistent on the time of day that appellant supposedly pushed
the vehicle to Andrea's residence. Andrea said it was between 6:30
and 7:00 pm., Diane Davis said it was between 8:30 and 9:00 pm.,
and Mr. Hardman said it was between 4:00 and 4:30 pm. Admittedly,
it would be expected for there to be some variance when witnesses
are

estimating

times

that

events

happened.

However,

the

differences here are too significant. For example, there is a five
hour difference between the testimonies of Mr. Hardman and Diane
Davis.

These inconsistencies make it inconclusive as to whether

appellant

actually

did

push

the
16

car

to Andrea's

residence,

especially in light of the fact that appellant presented witnesses
to indicate that he wasn't even available to do the purported acts.
Next,

this

investigating

case

could

officer had

have been

taken

vehicle as he should have done.

easily

fingerprints

decided

if the

from inside the

If appellant had been driving in

the vehicle, and if he had been working in and around the vehicle,
and if he had pushed it to Andrea's house, all as the State's
witnesses

allege,

any

reasonable

person

would

conclude

that

appellant's fingerprints would be somewhere in or on the vehicle.
However,

for whatever

fingerprints taken.

reason, the officer neglected

to have

Once again, the net result is that the

evidence is inconclusive as to whether appellant actually did have
possession of the vehicle.
Next, it is inherently improbable that appellant could have
been in work clothes, and could have been pushing a car to Andrea's
house at about 7:00 pm. when Bishop Collette testified that he met
with appellant and Kris Redmond at 7:00 pm., and appellant was
neatly dressed.
Because of the inconclusiveness and inherent improbability of
the evidence on many of the key issues in this case, there is no
question that the jury should have entertained some reasonable
doubt and found appellant not guilty.

17

CONCLUSION
Because there was insufficient evidence to show that appellant
either had possession of the stolen vehicle, or, assuming he did
have possession, that he knew it was stolen, the verdict of the
jury should be overturned. At a minimum, appellant should receive
a new trial due to the possible prejudicial effect of the court
calendar indicating that appellant had other criminal convictions.
Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 1996.

Mark T. Ethingtpn
Attorney for Appellant
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